experience, or by both.
It is, in every case, a relative one. That is, relative to the subject about which the expert is to testify. He may be sufficiently skilled in one subject and totally unskilled in another. He may, for example, be competent to testify that the deceased was asphyxiated, but not competent to say whether or not it was coal-gas or water-gas which caused death. He may be competent to say that the instrument causing death was sharp, but incompetent to say that the stains on the instrument were human blood.
The methods for obtaining this capacity may be by particularly prearranged training prior to entrance into his special field, or by occupational work which followed some form of previous training. Many famous experts have had very ordinary training prior to gaining experience in this work by occupation. Sometimes one of these methods shades into the other. Either is acceptable.
The calling of skilled medical men to the aid of the court was first recognized in 1345 when the court called upon surgeons to determine whether or not the question involved was one for courts or surgeons to decide2.
The first recorded expert testimony as such, was in 1620 in the case of Alsop vs. Kowheel2 . This was a case questioning the paternity of a newly born child. In this case a medical expert testified that should a child be born forty weeks and nine days after the death of the husband, the husband might well have been the father of the child.
Mental experts apparently came into being about 17233. In the early days in England the question of criminal responsibility was mitigated somewhat by the question of insanity. Prior to 1723 the two kinds of insanity recognized as defenses by the court were idiocy and lunacy. Then came what were called partial and total insanities. This, of course, closed almost entirely the gateway to Dunishment. In each case it was established that the partial insanity related directly to the crime involved. In 18003 an attempt was made to change this principle in the trial of Hadfield for shooting at the King in Drury Lane Theatre. The Attorney-General who prosecuted, insisted that to establish a defense of insanity there must be a total deprivation of memory and understanding. It seems to be the impression of historians that in the famous Bellingham case in 1812 the pendulum swung way over to the side of the prosecution. Bellingham was charged with the murder of Spencer Percival. It seems to have been proven that Bellingham was wholly incapable of caring for his own affairs and was subject to definite delusions. Despite this he was convicted because of his supposed knowledge of the difference between right and wrong. In 1 8433 a great change was made in the previous uncertain standing of the defense of insanity. Mr. Drummond was shot by McNaughton. McNaughton claimed insanity as a defense since he was under the delusion that Drummond was one of a number of persons who were following him everywhere. It was disclosed that he was able to carry on business and showed no obvious symptoms of insanity in his ordinary conduct. He was acquitted and thereupon the House of Lords propounded to several judges a questionnaire covering the law of insanity. As the result of this investigation it was finally decided: "To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act, the person accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." In general, this is the law today in this country with some modifications in various states.
The first recorded case covering the question of expert testimony in Connecticut was reviewed by the Supreme Court in 1812. It was then averred that the defendant, ignorantly, unskilfully and negligently, omitted to deliver said Martha, from the 29th to the 31st day of March, contrary to the well known rules of practice in such cases.; that by reason of such omission, and also by reason of his ignorance, carelessness, wickedness and want of skill, in attempting to deliver the child, the said Martha suffered great and unnecessary pain, was exposed to the most imminent danger of losing her life, lost her health, and received lasting and irreparable injuries and wounds; to their damage 5000 dollars, etc.
On the trial before the Superior Court, upon the plea of not guilty, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs.
In the course of the trial, the plaintiffs offered to prove, by the testimony of Dr. Cornwall and others, that the defendant, while attempting to deliver the child, made an incision on its head with a pair of scissors, or some other instrument, and therewith at the time, cut, injured and wounded the mother; and also, that the defendant, for bad management and want of skill, caused a lasting and irreparable injury to the internal parts of the mother, by the violent, unusual, and unwarrantable application of his finger to such parts. The defendant objected to this evidence, on the ground that the facts above specified, were not alleged in the declaration. But the court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence.
In the further progress of the trial, the defendant proved by the testimony of the sundry witnesses, that he sustained the reputation of a skflful physician, dancing and fencing master, etc., to the admission of which evidence, the defendant objected; but it was permitted by the court to go to jury. The plaintiffs also offered evidence to prove, that shortly after the attempt to deliver the child was made, the defendant declared, that said Martha was infected with the venereal disease, and that this was the reason why the delivery was attended with so much difficulty. The plaintiffs, at the same time, proposed to accompany this evidence with other proof, to show that said Martha was not infected with the venereal disease; and thereby to evince, that the defendant treated his patient unskilfully, and through ignorance or negligence in his profession, did not understand her case. This evidence was suffered to go to jury, but the court, upon its admission, informed the jury that such evidence was not admitted for the purpose of aggravating the damages on account of the slanderous declaration of the defen(lant, but merely to show the ignorance, and unskilfulness of the defendant in the performance of his professional duty.
The defendant, in support of his professional character, offered to introduce the testimony of Dr. Todd, a skilful and eminent physician, to show that the witness had been called with the defendant, to visit a certain patient, and that the defendant's prescriptions and advice in that particular case, were prudent and correct. This evidence was objected to, by the plaintiffs, and was by the court rejected.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that a new trial ought not to be granted. In this opinion the other Judges severally concurred; excepting Ingersoll, J., who having been of counsel in the cause, did not judge.
New trial not to be granted.
Medical experts are often derided for their willingness to present testimony for either side. Their most frequent critics in this regard are members of the bar. One authority5 frankly makes the statement that to please, the expert will stretch a point to aid the side that he represents; and alas, it may be true. Yet, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that these very physicians are the ones most often employed as experts by trial lawyers.
The law%yers and other critics of the medical expert must remember that medicine is not, and probably never will be, an exact science and because of this there will be many and great differences of opinions. In this connection, the famous case reported by lett' is worth reviewing. In California in 1899 a woman was injured in a railroad accident. She sued the railroad. Three medical experts appeared for the plaintiff and three for the defendant. All had examined the woman. All agreed that she had a uterine fibroid. The experts for the plaintiff testified that it was caused by the accident. The experts for the defendant testified that it was not. The jury found for the plaintiff. She was given a judgment of twenty thousand dollars. Ten days later she was delivered of a still-born baby. It would be difficult or impossible to believe that there was any collusion here. Certainly the doctors appearing for the defendant would have been pleased to testify that this was a pregnancy if they had been able to discover it.
One rarely hears a criticism of religion in general, despite the many sects all arguing on the same fundamental subjects, and all with different approach and different ideas. Who would be bold enough, or foolish enough, to discredit all religion because of the difference of opinion regarding it? If medicine were to be accepted as a finished and exact product, would not research, investigation and experimentation cease? It would be at a standstill and there would be no need for further study. Again, who would be foolish enough to recommend the acceptance of such a thought?
In the preparation of this paper the witness books in every court of superior jurisdiction of Connecticut covering the year from September, 1934, through June, 1935, were reviewed. Some very interesting facts were disclosed. Doctors appeared 677 times. It is quite true, also, that the same doctors appeared several times. Peculiarly enough, some doctors who have a hearsay reputation for doing a great deal of court work did not appear as frequently as was expected. In those courts where special records were kept as to trials before the jury, or the court without a jury, the former prevailed as many as nineteen times to one. In one county, damage suits in which medical experts testified were tried before a jury seventy-eight times to four suits that were tried before the court. One cannot help but get the impression that there is a definite, and probably not a good and honorable reason for this. However, if fault is to be found with the procedure, it certainly lies with the trial attorneys. It is probable they believe that juries will be more sympathetic than the courts, and that the special witnesses will make a greater impression upon a civilian jury than on the discriminating gentleman on the bench.
There seems to be a pretty general impression among trial lawyers that only truth is brought out on cross-examination. The fallacy of this is at once apparent to any medical man who has listened to, or participated in, any trial involving expert testimony. The medical expert, or any other technical expert, has either by special training or experience learned to fence with the lawyers; he has learned to protect himself against blows below the belt; he has learned to defend himself against brow-beating, coarseness, innuendoes, vulgarities, and insults; and it is not remarkable that many medical men of otherwise strong character, rather than submit to these, give the desired answer to the cross-examiner to get it over with and out of the way. This is not the way to bring out the truth. Indeed, many physicians well qualified to present expert testimony consistently refuse to become involved in legal activities because of this reason.
So much of protection in liability actions is now assumed by corporate insurers that their part in socio-economic life has become of vast importance. These great corporations employ skilful lawyers, well versed in the trial of liability actions, and it is generally accepted that because of this the poor man, the plaintiff, because of lack of funds, has not the opportunity to prepare his case as adequately, and is at once at a disadvantage. This is a sad commentary upon American justice that the bar has done little to correct. There appears to be an increasing tendency on the part of representatives of insurance companies to attempt to reduce honest bills submitted by medical men. It is the desire of these adjusters to settle cases always at a reduced rate. They call it "good business." It may be, but is it honest and ethical? They say that doctors pad their bills, and therefore they must level themselves down to such practice. Cannot honorable men make an honorable settlement without bartering?-and if such settlement were refused, the question could be then taken into court. Again, they say that a certain case has a nuisance value. Since when has honesty had only a nuisance value?
Little or nothing is taught in our medical schools which will guide a physician in subsequent experiences before the courts. There have been a number of books published-on the subject, none of which seems quite adequate. Lloyd Stryker7 in Courts and Doctors states that the witness stand is an ordeal, and that the contest of cross-examination is unequal. He gives the usual primer advice,-to come prepared, to be natural, to be modest. Not only is there no dependable guide for the physician, but even the legal profession itself seems to be at a loss for any standardized method of procedure. There is condemnation8 of the lawyers who appear in court inadequately prepared, and frame questions which make it difficult or impossible to bring out medical facts as they should be. The same writer criticizes the expert for accepting retainers in anticipation of future testimony, although he makes no comment concerning the lawyers who accept retainers for just the same purpose. Friedman' is particularly critical of the whole system of expert testimony. He states that the majority of judges distrust experts and describes them as intellectual prostitutes ready to sell to either side. He further points out that the way is left open for the charlatan to testify under the present system, and that trials are prolonged because of the length of the testimony. Another important point brought out in this critique is that juries are confused when one expert attempts to controvert the testimony of another. This is especially true of medical testimony; for, how any jury can decide a technical medical question when experts appear for both sides, one controverting the other, is beyond the comprehension of most people.
A survey of the opinion on expert testimony made among judges in England"0 and the United States disclosed that two-thirds of them thought that such testimony was of little value, and eight had a word of good for it. The extraordinary expense involved in obtaining expert testimony and the danger of partisan viewpoint are additional evils that have been pointed out by legal commentators.11 However culpable they may be, the lawyers and legal procedure should not be the sole obj ects of criticism. Physicians, too, are in part to blame for the sorry state of affairs. Dean Lewis, speaking before the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association at Cleveland in 1934, said:
The medical profession requires the good will and respect of the people. I know of nothing that makes people more suspicious of those engaged in the practice of medicine than the expert witness. Lay people must think that medicine does not even approach an exact science, when two men of equal distinction in medicine will give diametrically opposite statements to questions that are asked at a trial. Members of the bar realize the futility of much expert testimony, and I would like to see the bar association approached by a committee appointed by the House of Delegates to see whether some method of procedure could be devised by which the expert witness could be eliminated. A reference board, appointed by some competent authority or commission, would probably be most satisfactory, for it could examine in camera the testimony and the documents and hand down the decision, thus avoiding the amazement concerning the conflicting statements of equally capable men.
Any medical man who has observed his colleagues on the witness stand knows that some physicians, and happily they are in the minority, do stretch their testimony to favor the side for which they are appearing, and will mold their opinions to suit the case. It is also well known that in some instances the nature and the extent of injuries, or illness, have been magnified to suit the case on trial, and occasionally unfair and unwarranted testimony is given, and the duration of the incapacity has been prolonged. It is also probable that doctors testifying for insurance companies, or for large corporations by which they have been retained on a more or less permanent basis, have minimized the injury or illness of the plaintiff. But these are not usual occurrences; for the most part it is quite certain that physicians testifying are interested in seeing that a conclusion, founded on justice and truth, is reached.
A few plans have been formulated and put into practice with the view of clarifying the entire matter of expert testimony. The fact that there are various schemes is evidence that no one is reliably fruitful of good results. During the preparation of this study, interrogations were addressed to the Attorney-General in every state of the United States, and it appears that there are only five states with specific constitutional provisions covering expert testimony. Rhode Island has adopted a plan of disinterested experts selected by the court upon the application of either the plaintiff or tne defendant, the fee for the services of these experts is paid by the side requesting them. There is, of course, valid criticism of this procedure because of the liability for the stretching of testimony in favor of the side paying the expert. In Michigan, each side is allowed three experts except in homicides where any number is permitted. There seems to be little in favor of this system except that the number of experts in civil suits is limited, and the course of the trial may thereby be expedited. In the State of Washington the court may appoint experts; nothing is said about the number or fees. The same method is employed in California, where the judge selects the expert. The Louisiana courts may appoint experts for their own benefit, or upon the request of either side. There is just criticism of all of these plans in that a man may be a very great jurist and still be a very poor judge of the abilities or knowledge of physiclans.
All of the remaining states cover the question of expert testimony in a general way, similar to the practice in Connecticut. In other words, forty-three states have no special constitutional provisions covering expert testimony, and five have made half-hearted or partial steps to correct it. Several other states have attempted at one time or another to solve the problem, but always have been thwarted by one group or another; not infrequently by the members of the bar.
Connecticut is challenged by the same situation that exists in the courts of other states. Perhaps affairs here are not so bad as they are in some other jurisdictions, they may be worse here than elsewhere; but in either case it is a matter to which physicians and attorneys alike should give their honest and thoughtful attention. From the medical point of view, certain ideal procedures suggest themselves. First, under the existing laws, any doctor may appear as an expert upon medical or surgical questions. This, of course, is ridiculous. All medical merr are not equally equipped to appear as experts, except in the simplest cases. It requires very special training and experience, and is as much a definite field as any of the well-known refined specialties in medicine. So it seems desirable that the qualification of medical experts be made more stringent. Second, the testimony given in court should be of as high character, and as honestly conceived, as a scientific paper to be read before a medical society. Third, the fee to be paid should be a standard one; thereby eliminating the cutting question so frequently asked-"How much do you expect to be paid for your testimony?" When this question is asked the inference is obvious that the expert is appearing wholly for his fee, whether or not his side of the case has merit. Lastly, and with no criticism of the honorable gentlemen on the bench, they are not necessarily, by training, qualified to make wise choice of medical experts, or to appraise thoroughly the testimony of such experts; and it should properly be delegated to medically trained persons.
It is hardlv to be expected that any corrective measures will be initiated by the legal profession; indeed, it is quite proper that the first steps to rectify these evils should be made by organized medicine, and the following suggestions are offered for consideration. Any correction of the situation must be in conformity with Section 21 9 of Article I of the Constitution of Connecticut, which provides "that the right of trial by juries shall remain inviolate." To attempt to amend this provision would be cumbersome and expensive, and in all probability impossible of accomplishment. Therefore, an optional course of procedure should be provided in suitable legislation to be based wholly and entirely on the fact that the Connecticut State Medical Society shall submit to the Governor a list of properly qualified physicians in all specialties in medicine. From this list of names, the Governor shall appoint a desired number who shall be known as Commissioners, or Referees, of the Superior Court. From the approved list of referees, the judge hearing a particular case shall select one to take medical testimony. For example, if it is predominantly an orthopedic case, an orthopedist from the group should be selected to act as commissioner. Both sides may appear before the referee, and through counsel introduce their medical evidence. Expert witnesses shall be subject to examination, and cross-examination, thus retaining for the attorneys the timehonored privilege in which they place so much dependence. Having taken the expert testimony of both sides, and having weighed this testimony carefully, the referee, or commissioner, would submit his report to the court, to be read as evidence to the jury. The right of appeal from the commissioner's decision shall not be denied.
This proposed legislation must, of course, be optional, and give the counsel for either party the privilege of accepting this plan or following the present method of trial. It seems reasonable to believe that under the proposed new plan juries would find themselves in a very much better position to determine technical values than they are at present with one group of experts testifying to one thing, only to be contradicted by another group. It is possible that this system of medical reference might also be added to the administration of the office of Commissioner under the Compensation Act, so that the Compensation Commissioners could always have the benefit of unbiased medical advice.
That the Connecticut State Medical Society can furnish physicians whose honesty, integrity, ability, and judgment qualify them adequately to serve as referees, will not be doubted. There are many members of the Society whom, sitting as commissioners, one would hesitate to attempt to bluff, or to whom one would hesitate to make the preposterous statements which, at present, are not infrequently made to juries. There are physicians in this state, so revered by Ilo all, that one simply would not attempt, before them, a distortion of the truth.
Founded solely on the basis of fairness and honesty, the solution to the pressing problem of medical expert testimony seems to be quite simple; but it cannot be met by any legal chicanery or sanctimonious implication. The medical profession in Connecticut is anxious and ready to see the distortion of orderly justice rectified, and should appeal to the state bar, the insurance companies, and organized labor, for their cooperation.
